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Introduction
When we consider the development of the United States and Latin America during
the “long” 19th century in a comparative perspective, certain fundamental differences
and contrasts stand out regarding the respective political, social and economic condi-
tions. There is a progressive democratization of the political system in the North as oppo-
sed to lasting oligarchic rule in the South; greater social mobility in the U.S. in contrast
to rigid social structures in Latin America; and dynamic economic growth and differen-
tiation in the North as compared to initial stagnation and subsequent one-sided export-
orientation of the economies of the South. Even though this very general assessment
would certainly need to be further elaborated regarding regional and sectoral differences,
it nevertheless emphasizes some essential characteristics of the different developments
north and south of the Rio Grande, which also depended to a considerable extent on the
different landholding conditions in both regions. Certainly, after the decline of the tradi-
tional southern plantation economy in the U.S. in the wake of the Civil War of 1861-
1865, landownership patterns differed greatly in the North and the South. While in the
U.S. small and middle-sized family farms shaped the countryside, in Latin America the
agrarian sector was dominated far into the 20th century by large landholdings, with their
concomitant features of multiple labor, tenancy and sharecropping conditions.
This situation had a lasting impact on the two American regions with respect to poli-
tical as well as to social and economic developments. In the U.S. progressive democrati-
zation of landownership strengthened the democratization of the political system (as wit-
nessed, for example, before and during the presidency of Andrew Jackson, 1829-1837),
and –vice versa– access to land was furthered by the growing political weight of the rural
lower and middle classes after the American Revolution. In Latin America exactly the
opposite occurred. There, the peasants, effectively controlled and held in economic and
social dependence by the great estates, the hacienda, were not able to emancipate them-
selves politically and thereby exert pressure on the ruling elites to achieve more equita-
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ble land ownership conditions. Consequently Latin American regimes retained their oli-
garchic characteristics quite far into the 20th century. Social conditions in the two Ameri-
can regions were equally shaped by different land holding patterns. Certainly, the relati-
vely even distribution of land ownership in the U.S. could not prevent distinct social
contrasts in the U.S. society as a whole but it excluded, at least in the rural society after
1865, those extreme inequalities characteristic of societies dominated by large estates. In
Latin America especially the rural societies dominated by large landholdings showed a
very skewed distribution of wealth and income and produced a marked social marginali-
zation of land laborers, tenants and sharecroppers.
The different agrarian structures also influenced the economic development of both
regions. Agriculture based on small and medium-sized farms is frequently assumed to be
more efficient than one dominated by great estates. Within the American context, how-
ever, this assumption may not have been correct on purely economic terms, since both
the cotton plantations of the antebellum South of the U.S. and many modernized great
estates in Latin America from the last decades of the 19th century onwards excelled by
their considerable profitability. And even on the level of the national economy, the out-
put of an export-oriented agriculture based on plantations and haciendas was a central
factor of overall economic growth both in the case of the antebellum cotton production
of the U.S. and in that of the export oriented agricultural and cattle raising sectors in
Latin America before the 1930’s. In the long run, however, it is likely that the Latin
American agrarian structures had a rather adverse impact on economic diversification,
especially on a successful industrialization. In the U.S. industrialization set on early in
the 19th century in New England, i.e. in a rural society of small farmers, and manufactu-
re fuelled the extraordinary economic growth after the Civil War. In contrast, in Latin
America, dominated by large estates, industrialization started much later, remained more
restricted and failed to trigger an economic dynamism similar to that in the North.
In this article, we shall try to give a short, comparative outline of the evolution of land-
holding patterns in the U.S. and Latin America, i.e. the “access to land” during the “long”
19th century. Our main interest focuses on the political and social factors responsible for,
and at the same time dialectically influenced by, the very different developments in these
areas. As for the social and economic consequences of these developments, they will be
alluded to rather briefly. At first, one might be tempted to consider such a comparison as
hardly conducive to the answering of general questions about the “character” of a state
such as the social base of political systems or the presence or lack of efficient mechanisms
to settle social conflicts “democratically”, since the state-run land policies seemed to occur
in a completely dissimilar context, the main difference being the territorial expansion of
the U.S. during the 19th century as compared to the situation of most Latin American coun-
tries. This meant that in the U.S. access to land occurred under circumstances character-
ized by the existence of huge amounts of “free” land west of the Appalachians (i.e. in a
region of allegedly unclaimed property), transferred to the patrimony of the Union: the so
called public domain. In the core provinces of Spanish America, by contrast, the subse-
quent land tenure system of the 19th century –Creole estates and Indian communal hol-
dings– had already been shaped during the colonial period in most parts of the later natio-
nal territory and not only on a relatively narrow Atlantic coastal strip as in the case of
British North America. Therefore land tenure in the South was already largely moulded at
the beginning of the national period and much less “open” than in most of the later U.S. 
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Nevertheless, at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, the later
development of land tenure both in the U.S. and in Latin America was not yet determi-
ned to such a degree that a more detailed analysis of this process could not reveal some
interesting insights into the political and social factors influencing the land policies. For,
on the one hand, in British America, too, great estates existed far beyond the end of the
colonial period, even outside the plantation economy of the southern colonies. On the
other hand, land tenure conditions in Latin America were subject to considerable change
as well, be it by the alienation of large church properties, the transformation of commu-
nal land holdings into private property, the transfer of public lands to individual owners,
the partition of great estates or the arbitrary appropriation of land by political and mili-
tary rulers. Furthermore, during the 19th century, the countries in the southern cone of
South America (Argentina, Chile) experienced a southward expansion, which –espec-
ially in the case of Argentina– was strongly reminiscent of the simultaneous westward
expansion of the U.S., including phenomena such as the removal and extermination of
Indians, the emergence of a frontier, etc. Yet the outcome of this process, regarding the
access to land and the resulting land tenure patterns, differed completely from that of the
U.S., as in Argentina the great estate clearly prevailed over the operator-owned family
farm, which could gain a foothold only during certain periods and in restricted areas. It is
for this reason that the U.S. and Argentina are the subject of this comparative article on
the development of land tenure. Since the case of U.S. land policy is generally better
known and more thoroughly studied than that of Argentina, which even in recent re-
search is still more controversial, more attention will be paid to the latter than to the for-
mer. After treating the two countries separately, some central factors of the different
developments will be discussed in a comparative conclusion.
The United States, 1790-1862
At the end of the colonial period, land tenure conditions in the thirteen British-Ame-
rican colonies contrasted remarkably with the more equitable landholding patterns one
hundred years later. At that time, landed estates were widespread not only among the
slave owning planters of the South, but also in the middle-Atlantic colonies. However, in
British North America, alongside the great estates, small- and middle-sized holdings also
existed which in New England even constituted the dominant form of landed property
(Karsky 1983: 1374). Furthermore, there were the small farmers in the frontier regions,
the so-called squatters, who vehemently defended their holdings, very often forcing
eventual legal recognition of their property. Whereas the peasants in Latin America were
fully disregarded politically, the lower and middle classes in North America played a
more prominent political role at the end of the colonial period, either because of their
relative autonomy (frontier farmers, squatters) or because of their formal participation in
local self-government. 
In the years just preceding, during and immediately following the American Revolu-
tion, political unrest among the lower rural classes gathered momentum. 
Whatever the local conditions of rural discontent, whatever the specific complaints and
demands –land problems, heavy taxes, currency shortages, inadequate representation– the
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movements both of the colonial and the early national periods share a common denominator
of social conflict and search for alternative solutions to contemporary problems other than
those sustained by the ruling political order (Karsky 1976: 88).
At the time of the war itself, with its radicalizing tendencies, small farmers became
more militant. On a much larger scale than the later “revolutions” of Independence in
Latin America, the North American settlers’ revolt against the British motherland (1776-
1783) was also a struggle for the political power structure within the American colonies.
As the “first mass mobilization war of modern times” (Mann 1995: 152) it united the
patriots of the various colonies and it combined the anti-British upper class with the
white middle and lower classes. Although the war did not overthrow the existing social
order, it triggered democratic reforms such as the abolition of property qualifications for
voting, of colonial privileges, etc. (Mann 1995: 153). As for the land tenure system, the
American Revolution caused a certain diminution of colonial inequalities, too. Outside
the plantation sector, a considerable amount of land in the hands of powerful landholding
families was confiscated or transferred to public property, especially in the case of emi-
grated loyalists. “Consequently freemen in good standing with the authorities were able
to acquire small tracts of land, and, generally speaking, the larger holdings were inter-
spersed with small farms” (Gates 1976: 216).
Yet, the American Revolution was not a victory of the small land owners over the
still existing big “landed interests” since it was mainly this class that held political and
military sway during the North American War of Independence. Thus, the military hie-
rarchy was also able to keep the levelling social and political tendencies of the lower
classes in check (Tobler 2000: 57).
This outcome of the American Revolution determined not only the passing of the
Constitution of 1787 and the successful establishment of the United States, it also laid
the basis for the land policy of the U.S. in the future. This land policy was based on the
Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The latter concerned the
territorial expansion of the U.S. into the regions west of the Appalachian Mountains,
notably the admittance of new states to the Union. The former regulated the survey and
sale of the western lands ceded by the new states to the federal government1. From this
time on, the latter owned all the land from the Appalachians to the Mississippi, later to
include the immense territory bought from France in 1803 west of the Mississippi River
(the Louisiana Purchase) and the land acquired in the Mexican War of 1846-48, i.e. the
south-west of the United States. 
The land policy of the United States between 1790 and 1862 (passing of the Home-
stead Act) has been the subject of many controversies. While some students of the land
policy, such as Paul W. Gates, one of the leading historians in this field, have emphasized
certain obvious flaws in its shaping and management, others, like the economic historian
Douglass C. North, have stressed the qualities of the land ordinances of the 1780’s as a
more than adequate institutional framework for the transfer of land from public to priva-
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te ownership and, for that reason, conducive to economic growth, even though the welfare
effects of this policy are more difficult to assess2.
The variations of the land policy since 1790 were matched by political and social
changes taking place in this period, especially the growing political weight of the “com-
mon people” against the old, aristocratic East Coast establishment.
In the decades following the founding of the nation, the government’s main interest
was to improve its financial position through land sales. Accordingly, between 1785 and
1800, the maximum size plot was set at 640 acres (260 ha) costing 2 dollars per acre. As
a result, many speculators and wealthy land companies secured huge amounts of the
available western lands, often on the basis of exerting considerable political influence.
Poorer potential settlers had less of a chance to obtain land. And squatters who had ille-
gally settled on unsurveyed land on the public domain had to fear for their property and
were even sometimes expelled from their claims by federal troops. In this respect there
was a clear difference between a more conservative federal land policy in the new terri-
tories and states of the West and a more liberal land policy in some of the original thir-
teen colonies, where squatter’s holdings were more often legalized and, sometimes,
government land was sold at very low prices or even ceded at no cost at all (Karsky
1983: 1383-1384; Robbins 1976: 8-10).
From the beginning, contradictory interests influenced the U.S. land policy. On the
one hand, there were the old and new landlords as well as the traditional East Coast esta-
blishment and, on the other, the settlers and squatters in the new western lands who were
most interested in the speedy opening up of the public domain at advantageous condi-
tions to their liking.
Within the specific context of the westward expansion of the U.S., with new states
entering the Union and the concomitant shifts in political power on the national level,
conflicts over land issues assumed a clear sectional character. Whereas the new western
states mostly stressed the need for an expansive land policy encouraging further settle-
ment, the more conservative eastern states pleaded for a more restrictive policy “to pre-
vent the public land states of the west from drawing population away from the east,
thereby reducing its congressional representation, and also affecting land values and
employment costs in the older areas” (Gates 1976: 215).
Generally speaking, between 1790 and 1862, there was a shift in political power
relations which favored the “agrarians” supporting a more democratic land policy in the
interest of settlers. This development was based on the continuous advancement of the
frontier and its demographic, social and political consequences. Owing to high demo-
graphic growth-rates and massive European immigration since the 1840s, the population
of the U.S. increased from 3.9 million to 31.4 million between 1790 and 1860. This
population growth occurred mostly on the western frontier, caused by domestic migra-
tion from East to West and later by the increasing numbers of European immigrants.
More and more territories in the West became new states of the Union when the required
numbers of free settlers (60,000) was reached. By 1840 “fully a third of the U.S. popula-
tion lived in the new states between the Appalachians and the Mississippi” (Adams 1999:
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57). Earlier, in the 1820’s, further democratization of the political system had already
been achieved, when the elitist caucus-System had been abolished as well as the remai-
ning property qualifications for the voting rights of white men. Thus, conditions were
ripe for the transition to a more popular, democratic government, no longer dominated
by the traditional East Coast elites.
With the election of Andrew Jackson, a prototype of the successful frontier pioneer,
as President in 1828, for the first time the new democratic forces prevailed. Though him-
self a prosperous land speculator in the beginnings of his political and business career, as
President, Jackson championed the cause of the small, independent farmers, “to save the
new states from a non resident proprietorship, one of the greatest obstacles to the advan-
cement of a new country and the prosperity of an old one” (Gates 1968: 175).
Thus, from the 1830’s, those political forces gained political strength which advoca-
ted a land policy in favor of land seeking settlers. Strongholds of the agrarians were the
new western states, supported by reform-oriented groups on the East Coast (Robbins
1976: 43). This coalition, on which Jackson’s “Democratic Party” was also based, achie-
ved congressional passage of the Pre-emption Act in 1841, thereby prevailing in one of
the most controversial issues of the land policy over the “Whig-Aristocrats” (Ashworth
1983: 37-39). This law, according to Robbins (1976: 91) a “capstone in the democratiza-
tion of the public land system”, granted squatters pre-emption rights to their claims,
arguing that only the labor of the pioneer farmers had given true value to the newly set-
tled lands. The culmination of this development –after the Graduation Act of 1852, redu-
cing even further prices for land which had failed to find buyers when first auctioned–
was the passage of the Homestead Act in 1862 (Gates 1968: 387-434). 
With it, the agrarians’ demand for free land out of the public domain was finally ful-
filled, so that small farmers could receive land at no cost. The Homestead Act usually
provided 160 acres of free public land to an individual who actually settled and cultiva-
ted it. Title to the land was granted after a certain period of settlement and cultivation;
this same law was also valid for immigrants who intended to become American 
citizens.
As indicated above, there were also trends in opposition to those favoring small
family farms. The role of powerful land companies and non-resident speculators has
already been mentioned. Even outside the South, where –east and west of the Mississippi–
alongside small farms the plantation economy continued to expand, there were tenden-
cies towards estate building, as Gates (1968: 197-198) has noted with examples in Illi-
nois and Iowa. In Illinois farms exceeding 5,000 acres accounted for more than 2 million
acres or about 6% of the entire area. “The heyday of the bonanza farmer in the prairies of
Indiana and Illinois was in the sixties and seventies, when the demand for land to be ren-
ted and worked by incoming immigrants was so constant that these landlords could deve-
lop their land with hired labor or tenants. These great bonanza farms –in Indiana they
were as large as 40,000 and 45,000 acres– rivalled in size of operations and value anyt-
hing in existence in the plantation South before the Civil War...”
If tenancy and the use of farm laborers were thus not absolutely unknown even in the
West, they were nevertheless not widespread. American migrants from large rural fami-
lies as well as immigrant peasants from Western and Northern Europe were hardly pre-
pared to become tenants or even farm laborers. Tenancy might possibly be viewed as a
transitional stage, as Gates notes: 
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The scattered bits of information we have on tenancy before 1880 suggests that in the fif-
ties it was regarded as a transitional stage in which few expected to remain for long, that
tenants were acquiring some livestock and equipment and, if they could not gain title to the
land they were improving, they would not tarry many years on it but would strike out for free
or cheaper lands farther west (1968: 215).
Under the political, social and demographic conditions of the U.S. in the first half of
the 19th century, large estates could only develop as the dominant form of land holdings
if they could effectively recruit and control dependent labor for the plantations. This was
the case especially in the South where cotton plantations expanded rapidly into the new
states east and west of the Mississippi. The laborers on these plantations were mainly
slaves, who constituted an important share of the overall investments of such estates,
often exceeding that in land. Thus, in 1859, “in the most important cotton producing sta-
tes, 44% of the total wealth was invested in slaves, while only about 25% was in land
(Adams 1999: 187)” But after the defeat of the South in the Civil War (1861-1865), the
abolition of slavery and the replacement of the plantation economy by a system based
mainly on sharecropping, large estates, even in the South, lost not only their economic
preponderance but also their political, social and cultural dominance.
Thus, generally speaking, the continuous expansion of the family farm characterized
the evolution of landholding patterns of the U.S. in the 19th century, notwithstanding the
fact that land from the public domain, whose minimum price had been lowered to 1.25
dollars per acre in 1820, was always only a part of the whole land offer on the frontier.
For the federal government granted land to the new states in the West for public use; further-
more the latter, besides the federal government, encouraged the construction of roads,
canals and, especially, railways with generous land grants to private investors. Thus, the
western railroad companies became the largest private land owners with well-organized
land sales activities. In this way private suppliers of land, among them individuals who
had acquired land at earlier auctions, completed the direct transfer of land from the 
public domain to individuals by the state. If land prices of private sales were often higher
than the minimum prices at public auctions (in the case of the railroad companies they
averaged 3 dollars per acre), so the quality of the soil and the market integration of the
new farms were also frequently better than in the case of auctioned land from the public
domain. In any case, in view of the marked competition between private and public land
suppliers, no land monopolies could evolve which could have secured excessive land prices
or even hindered land seeking-settlers from access to land. As D.C. North (1966: 132)
put it: “In fact, availability is the one clearly evident characteristic of the opening up of
the public domain”. 
Even if a potential farmer had to buy land –and did not receive it for free, as was pos-
sible under the 1862 Homestead Act– land prices were probably not decisive in the total
investments for establishing a frontier farm. According to Thomas Le Duc, cited by
North (1966: 127) the land price was “not the critical determinant in the success of the
authentic farm maker. An eighty-acre farm at $ 1.25 would cost him $ 100. This was only
a small fraction of his total farm-making costs. If he lacked the skills and the capital
necessary to develop a farm, free land wouldn’t help him.”
Bogue (1994: 303) estimates the total investment for a 150 acre farm on the frontier
in 1860, at approximately 1,000 dollars. With a minimal investment of 500-600 dollars
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for a small farm, the land price would only have been about 10% of the total. “One dollar
in 1860 was about the daily wage for an unskilled worker”, while the price of a field
slave on a booming cotton plantation was about 1,200 dollars (Adams 1999: 69, 78).
If liberal access to land in the 19th century was, at least psychologically, an important
factor in the enormous spreading of small and medium-sized farms in the U.S. (in Iowa,
for example, the most common farm size in 1860 was between 50 and 100 acres), the
long-term economic success of these farms was, however, in no way assured. On the one
hand this had to do with more and more adverse climatic conditions affecting the plain
regions opened up since the 1850s and 1860s, where traditional agriculture was halted at
about the 98th meridian. To be successful under these conditions a farmer needed to have
a much larger amount of land, to rely on intensified mechanization and on appropriate
farming techniques (dry farming), conditions that were seldom met by homesteaders. On
the other hand the general economic conditions for many American farmers worsened in
the years between 1865 and 1896, owing to the integration of the American agriculture
in the world market with its violently fluctuating prices. Even though, according to North
(1966: 137-148), there was no general deterioration of the economic conditions of the
American farmers (except in the 1870’s), at least in the Midwestern plains the farmers’
dissatisfaction with falling sale prices, soaring freight rates, excessive charges by midd-
lemen and high mortgage rates was sufficient to cause a vigorous political protest move-
ment between the 1870’s and the early 1890’s, which had a lasting effect on the political
scene of the U.S. At the same time the number of tenants among farmers in the West –i.e.
outside the southern States, where sharecropping had replaced the old plantation sys-
tem– increased notably between 1880 and 1900; in Iowa, for example, the percentage
rose from 24% to 35%, in Kansas from 16% to 35% (Bogue 1994: 294).
Nevertheless, at the end of the 19th century there was one clear result of the prece-
ding secular evolution of landholding conditions in the U.S.: the marked spread of family
owned and operated small and medium farms. “There were about 450,000 European-
American farmers by 1800. Fifty years later, the number was about 1.5 million, and by
1910, it was 6.4 million.” (Bogue 1994: 279). Despite all its deficiencies, the Homestead
Act was of great importance to this outcome. “During those years (1860-1920), the num-
ber of farmers in the United States increased by some 4.4 million. At the same time, 1.4
million homesteaders or their heirs received final patents, equivalent to 32 percent of the
increase in farm numbers.” (Bogue 1994: 289). Thus, at least regarding the access to
land, the Jeffersonian Dream of an American Republic of independent farmers had large-
ly come true in the rural parts of the United States in the late 19th century.
Argentina, 1810-1912
Unlike the thirteen British Atlantic colonies of North America, Argentina’s late colo-
nial estancia economy already bore the essential features of the landholding patterns that
were to crystallize a century later. It is true that both the estancia and the whole agricul-
tural sector underwent far-reaching changes during those decades, but the contrast bet-
ween a few well-entrenched large holdings, the estancias, and the rural universe of a float-
ing population without political influence and with highly variable rights to natural and
economic resources, remained unchanged. Nevertheless, it was not continuity which
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characterized Argentina’s rural history. Compared to the development in the U.S., the
growth of Argentina’s agriculture was characterized by sharp discontinuities and alterna-
ting cycles of sectoral dynamism and stagnation. Why then, we could ask, was it possible
that in such an unstable, fluctuating economic and political environment, the core of
rural social relations persisted? To put the question this way is unfamiliar for the usual
approach to Argentine history, which implies that it was the disparate landholding pat-
tern that lay at the basis of the difficulties in building a stable institutional framework
within which sustained development could have taken place. 
To be sure, there is no reason to cast doubt on the validity of assertions of this kind,
for the concentration of land tenure did have far-reaching consequences for most aspects
of the social, economic and political life. During the nineteenth century, however, Argen-
tina experienced several revolutionary moments, each of which opened the possibility
for change in the traditional landholding pattern. The first instance of a rearrangement of
power relations was the struggle for independence starting with the successful popular
resistance against two British attempts to occupy the city of Buenos Aires in 1806/07,
and leading up to the revolution of 1920. Then the fall of the dictator Juan Manuel de
Rosas (1829 to 1852) brought the liberals to power, once again ushering in a bewildering
phase of violent conflict at the end of which stood the creation of the Argentine Republic
in 1862. But the equilibrium between Buenos Aires and the interior provinces remained
fragile up to the end of the 70’s, when the porteño elites had to accept the federalization
of the city of Buenos Aires. The takeover in 1880 by General Julio A. Roca, who had
conquered the rest of the Indian territory a year before, established an authoritarian style
of party politics and brought a decade of relative political stability. This consolidated a
limited democratic system which would endure until the introduction of universal suff-
rage in 1912 (Gallo 1986: 377-391).
Besides these frequently abrupt political changes, a series of socio-economic proces-
ses altered the aspect of the Argentine pampas, which developed from a colonial hinter-
land to being the center of the country’s export economy. Where wild cattle once grazed
on wild land and gauchos roamed the countryside, large estancias increasingly laid claim
to both cattle and land, replacing the rough pampas grass with alfalfa to feed better bre-
eds of cattle, introducing wire fencing, and trying new economic activities such as sheep
raising and cereal production (Taylor 1948: 214). Thus, one could conclude there were
many opportunities in Argentine history to modify the uneven landholding pattern. But
none of them was made use of.
The expansion of Argentine territory and the regulation of access to newly conque-
red agricultural land occurred against this background. As in the U.S. at the beginning of
the 19th century, most of the territory of the Plata basin was “free” land used by nomadic
Indian tribes. With independence the new economic dynamism caused the Creole elite,
now in power, to force back the Indian population and to put the land to productive use.
In principle, the newly conquered land was to be handed over quickly from the state to
private individuals, according to market mechanisms, in order to establish a family farm
agriculture similar to the American example. However, political fragmentation of the
Argentine territory into autonomous provinces after independence led to different condi-
tions and paths of development. It is therefore not possible to examine the land policy of
the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata in general. Consequently, the following sec-
tions concentrate on Buenos Aires, the most important and best investigated province. 
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I. During the second half of the 18th century, abundance of land and cattle, which
had characterized the extensive colonial agriculture for so long, gave way to a situation
of relative scarcity. Now, both land and cattle began to be valued in economic terms and
property rights began to matter. Within this process of appropriation, the specific land-
holding pattern in the Río de la Plata emerged, creating the colonial estancia3. On the
one hand, its roots went back to land grants which the Spanish crown gave out to new
colonists according to their social status (Ferns 1960: 55; Giberti 1981: 45). These royal
mercedes stipulated a series of obligations and restrictions which were difficult to fulfill
and the beneficiaries in particular, who lacked influence within the colonial administra-
tion, were in constant danger of being expropriated. On the other hand, it was also possi-
ble to buy land from the royal estates, the tierras realengas, but procedures were extre-
mely time-consuming and expensive. Land prices were modest, but as the outlay to
legalize the property represented a fixed cost factor, wealthy buyers who could afford to
purchase large tracts were favored. Moreover, in the corrupt climate of the colonial admi-
nistration, property rights remained insecure, favoring even more the rich and influential
(Cárcano 1972: 7). In a strict sense, the tracts usually sold under this system in the pro-
vince of Buenos Aires were not large-scale landholdings. In fact, Horacio Giberti (1981:
47) states that in relation to the limited productivity, these holdings were too small to be
operated profitably. Before long, many of these holdings were bought up by wealthy
officers, functionaries and merchants. The colonial estancia came into being in the hands
of these men and their families who amassed estates of more than a hundred thousand
hectares. Only a few held incontestable legal titles to their land. Giberti (1981: 48) speaks
of no more than half a dozen at the end of the 18th century. This assertion contrasts 
with the traditional view of the late colonial economy as dominated largely by big cattle
estancias. Recent historical research on that period has shown that apart from the estan-
cia, a variety of medium and small scale cattle and farming units existed4. Obviously, the
late colonial rural sector did not fit the monocultural cattle economy so often evoked by
the traditional historiography. In the last ten years, historians have discovered that it was
a rather diversified economy, more diversified than in the first decades after indepen-
dence. In addition, the rural society did not seem to consist only of rich estancieros on
the one hand and a poor landless population made up of dependent peones and semi-
nomadic gauchos on the other. But these new findings should not be added up to produce
a general revisionist position. If we consider the uneven distribution of the land and,
above all, the highly discriminating quality of rights to it, it becomes clear that the center
of the late colonial economy was the estancia (Mayo 1995: 31). 
It is true that the smallholding sector based on family operated units was of consider-
able economic importance, especially in wheat production, but its members did not 
constitute a rural class. Neither were they integrated by convergent interests nor were the
smallholders clearly separated from the estancia sector. Rather, they existed as an
interstitial structure within the estancia economy, for the small farms were often located
between different large holdings or they were situated under various legal arrangements
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on the land controlled by the estancias. In particular, these family operated units were
not precursors of “family farms”, in the Jeffersonian sense of owner-operated establish-
ments. Thus, as a whole, they did not constitute an alternative model to the estancia eco-
nomy, as was the case with the freehold farms of the New England colonies, which expli-
citly represented a well-defined alternative to models of seignorial or capitalist rent
arrangements in other parts of North America (Clark 1993: 200). In contrast, the farms in
late colonial Argentina were complementary to the estancia. This is also underlined by
the fact that, when the number of large cattle-raising estancias grew significantly in the
last quarter of the 18th century, the farm sector expanded at the same rate
(Garavaglia/Gelman 1995: 80). 
There are still many unanswered questions concerning the socio-economic structure
of rural Argentina and the power relations embedded therein at the turn of the century,
but one thing is clear: the social relations in the rural sector on the threshold to indepen-
dence were sufficiently complex to allow for very different outcomes. The estanciero
class was certainly in a dominant position but there were other social sectors such as
peones, gauchos and small and medium farmers. With respect to property rights, the lat-
ter’s institutional status was weak, as most of them tilled their soil as tenants (arrendata-
rios), sharecroppers (aparceros, medieros) or squatters (ocupantes). But the war of inde-
pendence broke up the colonial social structure and destabilized the existing power
relations (Salvatore 1994: 74-102; Halperín Donghi 1975). 
In this revolutionary situation several factors seemingly pushed for an improvement
of the social position of the lower and middle sectors. For a time the social and political
elites had a reduced capacity to control the rural masses because the new Creole elite
was internally dislocated and could not immediately fill the spaces of power left vacant
by the expulsion of the Spanish ruling class5. Moreover, independence was not to be had
without the military mobilization of the rural masses. Such mobilizations had their ante-
cedents in the gaucho armies led by Creole officers against the British invaders of Bue-
nos Aires in 1806/07 –after the Viceroy had fled the city without having the Spanish tro-
ops offer any resistance to the British (Ferns 1960: 28). Finally the Creole political elite
had absorbed, at least in principle, a notion of equality based on French liberalism and
had a development model in mind that would resemble the North American example. 
In fact, at first sight, Argentina’s road to independence exposes some particularities
which remind one to a certain extent of the experience of the U.S. Apart from the fact
that it was the first to succeed on the continent –the Viceroy of the Rio de la Plata was
definitely deposed in 1810– there was above all the direct involvement of Great Britain
in those processes (Glade 1969: 182). On the one hand the defeat of the British troops in
Buenos Aires in 1807 had invigorated the self-confidence of the Creole elite and drawn
the lower classes onto the scene; on the other hand, the Argentine economy was closely
linked to the British market and British capital. After the end of the Spanish colonial
regime, these tendencies were reinforced but the protracted wars –first against the Spa-
niards, then through interregional and interfactional rivalries– which eventually led to
the provisional post-revolutionary system of 1820, had far reaching social and political
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consequences that differed completely from those caused by the war of independence of
the British colonies.
Probably the most significant difference from the example of the U.S. was that the
middle and lower classes never developed into a power factor of their own. They could
only marginally capitalize on their importance as an indispensable ally of the elites. This
was due to the weakness and limited scope of social relations within those classes inheri-
ted from the colonial era. The fluctuating character of rural society and the interstitial
position of the middle sectors had not been mitigated by the militarization of both the
society and the state. Thus patronage and coercion remained the main features of the
social relations between upper and lower sectors of society. From the beginning it was
the Creole elites which benefited most from the war. Not only did militarization provide
them with a framework to institutionalize their intra-class relations, but it also constitu-
ted the mechanism to establish stable channels of communication with the lower classes
(Halperín Donghi 1975: 155-156). 
Whereas the lower classes were exposed to growing militarization during the first
years of independence, a process of ruralization began to occur within the upper classes.
Blocked in commercial activities by the invasion of British merchants, many Buenos
Aires merchants invested capital in land and cattle and became estancieros. In this pro-
cess the power base of the urban ruling class shifted from the city to rural areas (Halperín
Donghi 1975: 377-402; Halperín Donghi 1995: 42). This does not imply that it became a
rural class. Post-independent estancieros rather combined rural and urban power net-
works. But they did not gain sole control of the state. From the beginning they had to
share power with an urban-based group of politicians who had made their way to power
as revolutionary intellectuals. To be sure, in sociological terms, the two groups were
never strictly separated but, as regards the state, a permanent rivalry over the use of
resources evolved between them. Usually conflicts arising out of these rivalries remain-
ed latent. In the context of the promising prospects in the world market, a basic consen-
sus on economic issues emerged that conceded pre-eminence to the cattle industry as the
center of an export-oriented growth model fostered by the new elites. Regional differen-
ces and rivalries, however, limited this overarching consensus to the provincial level.
Beyond that level a complex and conflictive network of personal and familial loyalties
and rivalries evolved. On the whole, therefore, the political system established in 1820
remained extremely fragile. This has been well depicted by Tulio Halperín Donghi
(1975: 396), indicating the difficulty for the new leaders to gain political stability. 
[They] were patiently trying to erect, […] on the basis of that tenuous yet complex net-
work of continually changing personal relationships, […] a system of mutual understandings
between locally influential figures which would at least partially fill the void left by the ruin
of the national state and its replacement by provincial states of only limited political vitality.
In other words, it was not possible to establish a stable regime on the provincial level
without finding a solution to the national question. 
II. In Buenos Aires the consolidation of the post-revolutionary regime and the suc-
cessful integration into the world market as a producer of hides, tallow and salted meat
intensified earlier efforts of territorial expansion and settlement. Already under the revo-
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lutionary regimes new land had been conquered. Although some of the land had been
sold or auctioned, most of it had been allocated by grants obliging beneficiaries to
occupy and cultivate the land within due time (Cárcano 1972: 19-26). These regulations,
however, had had only limited effects due to the ongoing wars and the instable political
situation. In 1821, the post-revolutionary government of Buenos Aires prohibited all
forms of land sales and grants and looked for a different mode of allocating land to pri-
vate individuals (Infesta 1998: 63-64). It was found in the enfiteusis system of Bernardino
Rivadavia, under which regime tracts of land were leased at a low rent for a term of
twenty years. The system was a compromise between the financial needs of the empty
treasury and the demand for land. As the province had guaranteed its rising debt with
public land, it could not sell it without the creditors losing their securities6. The enfiteusis
system tended to favor large holdings and land concentration because no upper limits
existed for the tract to be rented (Lynch 1985: 616; Infesta 1998: 66; Infesta 1999: 109-
111). It was also possible for the enfiteuta to sell his rights or to sub-rent part of his land.
Furthermore, allocation of the land was managed by committees under the control of the
large landholders. Under the enfiteusis system, between 1822 and 1836, most of the 
agricultural land of the province of Buenos Aires was leased in large tracts to a relatively
small number of approximately 500 landholders. This result was clearly contradictory to
the original intention of the law aiming at fostering yeomen farming in the province of
Buenos Aires (Glade 1969: 238; Giberti 1981: 121; Ferns 1960: 100). This failure cannot
only be attributed to the many imperfections of the law itself and in the application of its
clauses. It is also due to the lack of a social base of small and medium farmers or landless
families who were eager to become agricultural entrepreneurs and capable of exerting
political and juridical pressure. 
The political system of 1820 was not to endure because the mechanism that had
made it work was at the same time its weakness. It was rooted in the permanent penury
of the treasury of the provincial state, forcing the government to delegate certain executive
functions to local power holders who, in turn, would hold their clienteles in check and
thus guarantee the internal order7. This gave rise to a peculiar constellation consisting of a
weak (and poor) state and the most influential (and rich) members of the post-revolutionary
ruralized elite. These large-holding merchant-estancieros held the state in financial
dependency and used it to increase their own power base, but they did not act as a social
class using the formal political structure. On the contrary, they preferred to remain on the
fringe of the political institutions (Halperín Donghi 1975: 384-391). 
Towards the end of the decade declining exports, the exorbitant indebtedness of the
provincial treasury and the war with Brazil for the Banda Oriental threw this fragile
equilibrium of power within the ruling class off balance and triggered the political crisis
of 1828/29, which brought to power a man who combined in his person the various 
elements required to establish a stable political system. Juan Manuel de Rosas was a
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member of the porteño estanciero-elite, whose business network embraced all key sectors
of the Buenos Aires economy8. As a successful military leader he could count on the
loyalty of the army and the police forces. During the 20’s he had used his economic and
military resources to build up personal relationships with the rulers of other provinces.
At the same time Rosas was well-acquainted with the rough world of the rural masses.
His reputation of being a skilled gaucho and a ruthless but fair leader secured him the
loyalty of a considerable clientele –notably that of the gaucho militias, the backbone of
the armed forces of Buenos Aires (Vogel 1992: 350; Giberti 1981: 129). 
Rosas established a dictatorial regime which was to last more than twenty years.
Many historians consider the era of Rosas a crucial period for the Argentine land policy.
Under his rule a considerable area of Buenos Aires territory was passed from the public
domain to private individuals and the enfiteusis-system was abolished. Moreover, Rosas
succeeded in expanding Buenos Aires territory and in securing the frontier9. But in the
light of most recent research, the role of Rosas in predetermining later developments in
the Argentine land policy should not be overestimated, especially if we bear in mind that
after his fall in 1852, the provincial territory shrank to less than that of the pre-1833
situation (Infesta/Valencia 1987: 178). 
Rosas’ successors blamed him for giving out excessive land grants to the detriment
of the public domain10. Today, we know that this critique is misleading because most of
the public domain was regularly sold in public auctions11. But, as most of the land was
bought by former enfiteutas and large holders, the land sales did not change landholding
patterns; they did, however, change the structure of property rights. From now on, the
central arrangement with respect to land tenure would be unrestricted private property.
All other forms of tenure were measured from this point of reference. Undoubtedly,
these reforms laid the foundation for a more capitalistic mode of exchange but, on the
whole, Rosas fell short of initiating a thoroughgoing transformation towards capitalism.
As Jeremy Adelman correctly notes, Rosas brought a certain degree of political stability
–though on very fragile foundations– but he failed to establish another fundamental pre-
condition of a functioning market –an effective judiciary which would have been able to
enforce contracts between individual participants in impersonal exchange relations
(Adelman 1999: 129-132). Consequently, property rights remained uncertain. This was
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Rosas by Lynch (1981). Rosas was a cousin of the three Anchorena brothers Juan José, Tomás Manuel
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primarily true of small- and medium-holders; large-holding merchant-estancieros could
rely on family networks –based on real or fictive kinship– in order to secure their rights.
But their range of operation also remained limited compared to fully fledged market
relations.
III. After the expulsion of Rosas, his adversaries in all the Argentine provinces
endeavored to get rid of the dictator’s legacy. A new federal constitution was proclaimed
by the provinces in 1853. Only Buenos Aires distanced itself and the ancient conflict
dragged on between that province and the littoral and interior provinces now united in
the Argentine Confederation. In Buenos Aires a group of urban liberal intellectuals, often
called the Generation of 1837, attained power12. 
The new Buenos Aires rulers had to cope with an array of challenges. The struggle
with the Argentine Confederation weighed on the treasury and the Indians’ offensive
under their leader Calfucurá pushed back the frontier. Domestically, a new balance had
to be found between the state, local authorities and the estancieros, and a reliable judi-
ciary had to be built up which notably respected private property. With the foundation of
the Argentine Republic under Buenos Aires hegemony in 1862, the military threat came
to a temporary end. With respect to property rights the new regime’s record was ambi-
guous. On the one hand it did take measures to end the arbitrariness of the Rosas era, on
the other it acted too indecisively to disperse any doubts on its commitment to put priva-
te property before its own interest (Halperín Donghi 1995: 53). It hardly inspired confi-
dence when the regime took six years to resolve the dispute on the validity of the rosista
land grants and, eventually, annulled titles to the extent of some 17,000 km2
(Infesta/Valencia 1987: 204-206). 
The end of dictatorial rule did not signify the weakening of the central power. It did,
however, change the relationship between the landed elite and the state. In order to con-
trol the elections, the latter supported local power holders of sometimes dubious reputa-
tion, as long as they cooperated. Within this framework the political clout of the estancie-
ros was limited. Although a basic consensus on the pre-eminence of the cattle sector was
still respected, the relationship between the state and the estancieros was rather conten-
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Rev4-01  22/11/01 12:27  Página 25
tious, the most important issue being the public claim on the rural labor force. The general
scarcity of rural laborers was aggravated during the second half of the sixties because of
the drafts for the Argentine troops fighting in the Paraguayan war. It was in that situation
that a small group of enlightened estancieros founded, in 1866, the Sociedad Rural Argen-
tina. They made two claims: first, to be the leaders of the class of large landholders them-
selves, and second, the latter to be the legitimate representatives of the rural population at
large. Both claims proved to be unrealistic. The claim to the leadership of the estanciero
class failed because there did not yet exist the ideological and social prerequisites neces-
sary to form a political class capable of controlling the state13. The claim to hegemony of
the estancieros over the rural population could not materialize because only few people
lived permanently within the direct sphere of influence of the estancias. A mass of seaso-
nal laborers and short-term tenants moved back and forth between the work on estancia
land and other more independent occupations on the pampas. In other words, rural society
had an eminently nomadic character, which constituted a weak foundation for the estan-
cieros to build a hegemonic relationship with the rural lower and middle classes. 
This underlying structure of social power relations remained unchanged until the
electoral reform of 1912, which extended political participation and gave the lower and
middle sectors of society their own political weight. The stability is astonishing, for the
second half of the nineteenth century saw several far-reaching social and economic chan-
ges. First of all came the dramatic increase in sheep breeding. By the mid-sixties wool
took over as the most important export product. Forty million head of sheep were now
grazing on the pampas and had displaced the cattle to marginal areas (Sabato 1990: 26).
Sheep raising, together with technological innovations, such as the introduction of wire
fencing, raised land values and intensified production processes within the estancias.
The expansion of the railway network (notably from 1880 onward), brought formerly
remote regions closer to the international markets and lowered transport costs, contribu-
ting to the breath-taking expansion of cereal production14. In the 80’s, within a few years,
Argentina advanced from an importer of grain to one of the world’s largest wheat expor-
ters (Taylor 1948: 91; Gallo 1984: 212; Meissner 2000: 188). This, however, would not
have been possible without a heavy influx of foreign laborers. 
To achieve this, the Argentine government actively fostered European immigration.
It was perfectly successful in procuring the labor force necessary to the expanding agri-
culture. As sheep breeding had changed the herds into flocks, immigration now changed
the structure of the rural population. Between 1870 and 1914, almost six million immi-
grants entered Argentina, most of them coming from Italy and Spain. Despite this, with
respect to the objective of populating the pampas with European settlers, the policy tur-
ned out to be a failure. Only little over half of those who arrived in Argentina settled per-
manently in the countryside, many of them seeking their fortune in the city of Buenos
Aires and not in the countryside. In a sense, the high rate of temporary immigrants
reflects the fluctuating pattern of the pampas society, its most salient expression being
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the so-called golondrinas (swallows), seasonal workers from Italy and Spain who cros-
sed the Atlantic and the equator twice a year to participate in the harvests of both coun-
tries15. Nevertheless, net immigration accounted for a good deal of the impressive growth
of the total population from about 1.7 million in 1869 to over 7.8 million in 191416. 
Those who stayed in the Argentine countryside did not necessarily become landow-
ners. Many failed because of ever-rising land prices, which made it increasingly difficult
for landless rural workers to purchase a plot17. For example, the share of the costs for
land in the initial outlay of capital necessary to establish a medium sheep farm rose from
less than 25 percent before mid-century to over 70 percent by the eighties18. Under these
conditions only a minority of the immigrants were able to surmount the last step of the
“agricultural ladder” and become landowners19. Most of them were drawn into a system
of short-term tenancy that evolved as a response to the estancieros need to improve their
pastures in order to feed the new sorts of cattle introduced for meat production. Gene-
rally, the estancieros leased out certain lots for a two- or three-year term during which
the tenant could sow wheat for his own benefit. After the contracted term the tenant had
to leave the lot sown with alfalfa as pasture for cattle20. 
The wheat-alfalfa-cattle-cycle made the tenants live a nomadic life, regularly moving
from one leasehold property to another. As they did not become settlers on owner-opera-
ted units, their relationship with the soil as an economic resource and with the state as
guarantor of property rights and contracts remained weak. This is especially true of
many immigrants who were not naturalized and, consequently, lacked any political rights
on the national level21. As foreigners they were not addressed by the political actors as a
power base and remained outside the political system. The social and political margina-
lity of the tenants –and notably of the immigrants– was not just the result of structural
barriers to incorporation. Many of them remained willingly on the margin of the Argentine
society. As tenants they chose to invest in cattle or to lease larger tracts instead of locking
up their capital in land. As foreigners they had more faith in the assistance of the 
diplomacy of their fatherland than in the Argentine state. 
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21 See for this Solberg (1970: 117-128). In some provinces foreigners did possess political rights on the
municipal level. The abolition of the municipal political rights of foreigners by the provincial govern-
ment of Santa Fe in 1890 constituted a major reason for the violent uprisings of colonists in 1892/93.
See Scobie (1964: 128, 154); Gallo (1977: 338-339); Gallo (1984: 368-373).
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In sum, all these changes –the shift to sheep raising in the 70’s, the return of cattle
raising towards the end of the century in response to technological innovation in the pro-
cessing and cooling of meat, the diversification of agricultural production, massive
immigration and the expansion of the railway network– were the ingredients of an
impressive period of growth22. By the end of the century the Argentine per capita income
equalled that of Germany, Holland and Belgium, and economists mentioned Argentina
together with other most advanced countries of Western Europe, the United States, Cana-
da, and Australia23. Argentinians, in turn, did not fail to perceive these achievements
with pride. In 1910 a publicist, referring to Argentina, enthusiastically asked: “[W]hat is
the nation that, within only one century of sovereign existence, […], has been able not
only to amass the colossal fortune, the immense material riches which this nation posses-
ses, but also to achieve the degree of civilization and culture that the fatherland of the
heroes of the May Revolution has achieved?”24. 
IV. The commitment of the Argentine government to development and moderniza-
tion was always associated with the notion of creating a class of yeomen farmers in the
pampas. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a series of regulations concerning
the allocation of land were put into effect. They had to bridge the diverging interests of
the government in selling the public land to small and medium farmers on the one hand,
and in making high and immediate profits to fill the empty treasury on the other. This
ambiguity was reflected, for example, in the revision of the land legislation in 1864. It
granted tenants and subtenants an option of purchase, but the deadline for payment was
too short, and small tenants in particular failed to obtain the necessary capital. In view of
the quasi non-existence of long-term borrowing and general usurious interest rates for
small scale borrowers, only few small and medium operators chose to buy. Under these
conditions the law rather intensified than weakened the tendency towards land concen-
tration (Cárcano 1972: 122-124). 
Usually, the various laws concerning public land were, in the long run, only of limi-
ted importance for the evolving structure of landholding. It was, above all, socio-econo-
mic and political processes that shaped the modes of distribution and allocation of land.
To a certain extent the famous general law on land, immigration and colonization of
1876, named after its creator Nicolás Avellaneda, president of the Republic from 1874 to
1880, was an exception. In 1945, A.F. Zimmerman (1945: 24) called it “one of the best
land laws that Argentina ever possessed”. In fact, in its fundamental traits, it was in force
for more than thirty years. The law was designed to foster the settlement of immigrants
as yeomen farmers; not surprisingly, it reflected the US-American land laws in many res-
pects. For example, it provided for previous surveying and division of the land into small
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farms of one hundred hectares each. The first one hundred lots in a given area were gran-
ted free to interested settlers. The remaining farms were sold at the low price of two
pesos per ha (about eight cents in gold pesos). However, the law did not live up to expec-
tations. Within twenty-three years only seventeen colonies were founded and less than
5000 km2 placed under cultivation (Zimmerman 1945: 24). According to Miguel A. Cár-
cano (1972: 160), the law mainly failed because it left the possibility open for indirect
colonization by private companies, thus encouraging speculation and further concentra-
tion of land. Another drawback was that the settlers only got their titles after having ful-
filled certain conditions stipulated by the law, which left them at the mercy of local,
sometimes corrupt, civil servants25. The uneasy situation of the settlers is graphically
summarized by Cárcano:
The very title of property was delayed and he [the settler] constantly felt the uncertainty
of his rights. Depending on the government, he was in permanent danger of suffering the
modifications of new laws and rules, capricious or selfish interpretations, delays and vicissi-
tudes. He lived on land which, in reality, was not his own; he could not offer it as security for
a credit, because he was subject to conditions susceptible to diverse interpretations and modes
of enforcement26.
After the Conquista del Desierto (1879), which enlarged the Argentine territory by
about 350,000 km2, the economic background for the regulation of access to land chan-
ged dramatically. While in 1865 the total area of tilled land in Argentina was estimated to
be less than 1000 km2, at the end of the century it embraced more than 200,000 km2. At
first glance, the elimination of the Indian threat had at last created a situation similar to
that in the U.S. and Canada, with thousands of square kilometers of free land open for
colonization. Now, the Jeffersonian dream of Argentine liberals seemed to come true. 
Strongly influenced by U.S. legislation, the land policy of president Roca aimed at
favoring colonization. For example, it recognized the rights of squatters who had helped
to protect the frontier. Those who had lived for over thirty years on the land they claimed
were granted definite titles. Later squatters could obtain a price reduction of up to two
thirds when buying their plots. Another means of populating the remote agricultural
lands in the Chaco and Patagonia was the Ley del hogar of 1884, the Argentine version
of the U.S. Homestead Act, which provided for a division of 27,000 km2 into farms of
625 hectares. Soon, however, the size of these farms proved to be too small for them to
be operated profitably, and most of the land in Patagonia was bought up by a few large
companies (Cárcano 1972: 181-182; Zimmerman 1945: 23-25; Scobie 1964: 116).
Colonization schemes also failed in the pampas, the zone best suited for farming.
This can be attributed only in part to imperfections in legislation and law enforcement.
The very conditions of the military campaign against the Indians prevented widespread
colonization. To finance the expedition, the state had given out government bonds
exchangeable for land as the frontier advanced (Scobie 1964: 39, 47-50; Gaignard 1989:
32-33). Thus, most of the newly conquered territory was turned over to bondholders.
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What remained was auctioned in large chunks, and by 1884 most land was in private
hands (Gaignard 1989: 253). Only some marginal land was eventually granted by Presi-
dent Roca to the soldiers of the 1879 military campaign. 
The rapid process of appropriation was not accompanied by the seizure of the new
lands. Many proprietors did not even know the location and quality of their lots. Only the
expansion of the railway allowed for the gradual occupation of the “desert”. In these cir-
cumstances it was not the state but private colonization companies and big landowners
that set the terms for the colonization of the pampas. This was even true of the province
of Santa Fe, which had promoted colonization since the 1850’s and where, compared to
other regions of Argentina, a relatively strong family farm sector had developed. But,
after 1880, farmers could not benefit from the southern expansion of the province into
the pampas. The impressive growth of Santa Fe’s wheat production was mainly based on
the expansion of tenancy and sharecropping (Cortés Conde 1979: 121; Gaignard 1989:
364-374; Gallo 1984: 89-93). 
In historiography the results of the conquest and subsequent occupation of the new
territories, the pampas, the Chaco and Patagonia, are hardly in dispute. Minor disagree-
ments exist on such issues as the evolution of land values, the tendency towards subdivi-
sion of large holdings, the opportunities for immigrants and the defining of periods.
Agreement, however, prevails that the territorial expansion in general favored the cattle
industry more than agriculture and that it did not fundamentally alter the landholding
pattern of Argentina. Yet, different explanations arise concerning the causes of such an
outcome. We can mainly distinguish two approaches, one stressing institutional factors,
the other emphasizing prevailing factor endowments. The former argues that it was
above all the monopolization of land by the estancieros and imperfections in legislation
and jurisdiction which blocked the way for the immigrants to become owner operators.
The latter, however, focuses on the lack of demographic pressure relative to the new
territories, on the complementary economic relationship between cattle ranching and
wheat growing, on inadequate transport facilities and on the relative prices of land, cattle
and wheat27. 
At a closer look, the different interpretations are not mutually exclusive, they rather
complement one another. This has to do with the very course of the territorial expansion.
The appropriation process in the 80’s was accompanied by speculation and monopolistic
tendencies. The general crisis in 1890 brought about a change, and land prices which had
dramatically risen during the 80’s fell sharply. The decline of land values discouraged
pure speculation and favored colonization and the subdivision of holdings. But the best
land remained in the hands of large holders who managed to cultivate their domains pro-
fitably under various forms of tenancy. After the mid 90’s land values rose again and it
became increasingly difficult for newcomers to buy land. At the same time, revolving
round the thriving meat-processing industry, the urban labor market provided favorable
conditions for immigrants. For them to buy plots and settle as farmers was only one
option among others –and not even the most attractive one (Scobie 1964: 161, Klein
1983: 318-319; Cortés Conde 1979: 209-210). 
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Against this background it was difficult for small holders and tenants to form politi-
cally powerful organizations. On several occasions they rebelled but their actions were
short-lived and seldom went beyond the municipal level. Only in 1912 did a prolonged
strike of tenants and seasonal workers put the “agrarian question” on the national agen-
da. But by then the lower and middle rural classes had already been absorbed by the
Radical Party and were dominated by urban interests. Unlike the U.S., the territorial
expansion of Argentina neither brought forth a strong rural class of small and medium
farmers nor altered the power balance between Buenos Aires and the rural provinces.
After the Conquista del Desierto most of the new land had been declared property of the
national state and had been divided into administrative entities under the direct jurisdic-
tion of the central government. These Territorios Nacionales lacked the demographic,
economic and political dynamism of the National Territories in the west of the U.S., and
it took them a long time to gain the status of provinces with equal rights within the fede-
ral framework28. 
The dynamic growth process during the fifty years following the Conquista del
Desierto did not create the conditions to overcome the traditional landholding pattern of
Argentina. Without a self-confident class of family farmers strong enough to press politi-
cally for their own interests, any reform project was doomed to failure from the begin-
ning. In his comparative study on Canada and Argentina, Carl E. Solberg (1985; 1987)
brought out this point very clearly. He saw the absence of a strong pressure group of far-
mers as one of the main reasons why the Argentine state never implemented a concise
agricultural policy in this respect. But Jeremy Adelman (1994) might well be correct
when suggesting that the outcome would have been the same even if there had been
more political pressure from the farmers. Argentina differed in several other key factors
from Canada, among them being the weak political institutions, the delayed class forma-
tion and the wider palette of agricultural export opportunities. Development along the
path of family farming would probably not have been feasible, or, at least, not optimal.
Argentina took another path of growth, that of concentrated property and large landhol-
ding –and prospered remarkably during several decades. But as no synergy effects evol-
ved between economic growth and political democratization, it accumulated a debt of
stagnating productivity, social inequality and political exclusion that was to be paid off
when the phase of extensive growth came to an end in the 1930’s.
Conclusions 
Comparisons of countries like the U.S. and Argentina are ultimately driven by an
interest in the question of the one’s “success” and the other’s “failure”. Although it is not
an easy task to define such normative concepts exactly, in our case it is sufficiently
obvious that the U.S. has done much better than Argentina in terms of almost any rele-
vant social, economic or political indicator. While the U.S. is often presented as the
model for successful development of a so-called “region of recent settlement”, in the
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case of Argentina scholars try to find causes for her presumed failure29. The vast array of
explanations embraces features such as distinct colonial traditions, contrasting condi-
tions of territorial expansion, or general differences in culture and mentality. But more
fundamental arguments concerning, for example, the importance of internal and external
factors or the role of free trade vs. dependency have also been developed. Moreover, a
series of theoretical approaches addresses the problem30. 
Within this larger context, the present paper focuses on the evolution of different
landholding patterns in North and Latin America, certainly one of the most crucial
aspects of development in regions of recent settlement. Well aware that neither subconti-
nent constitutes a homogeneous historical case, we restrict ourselves to comparing the
landholding patterns of Argentina with those of the U.S. At the same time, we pay spe-
cial attention to the role of the state in the formation of the landholding patterns. It goes
without saying that in this period of time non-governmental, notably economic, factors
also influenced that development. Nevertheless, public land policy was of decisive
importance in the U.S., while its impact was more limited in Argentina. It is interesting
to note that the ideal of independent yeomen farmers played a crucial role, not only in
the U.S. where a real model of a rural society of this kind existed already in colonial
New England, but also in Argentina where it found its way into numerous laws. Even in
Mexico where great estates were firmly established at the end of the colonial period, the
notion of an independent yeomanry was of some importance, for example during the
Reforma in the 1850’s or, in the late 19th century, in the context of the laws on public
land (baldíos). But, in fact, the agrarian structure of small and middle-sized family farms
only took hold in North American society, whereas in the south the dominance of large
landholding remained intact or, in some cases, even intensified. 
In our opinion, the most important factors for these contrasting developments lie in
the different political and institutional conditions, which will be briefly reviewed in com-
parative perspective. First, the influence of political or political-military factors for the
access to land will be discussed; then follows a description of the role of the respective
land policies; finally, some institutional and economic factors will be listed to explain the
diverse landholding conditions in North and Latin America, i.e., more precisely, in the
U.S. and Argentina. 
I. Commenting on the significance of historical traditions in Latin America, Tulio
Halperín Donghi (1969: 145) laconically noted the central importance of the political
appropriation of land in Latin America: 
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The Revolution did not obliterate one characteristic feature of Spanish American reality:
namely, even after achieving independence, the support by the political-administrative power
remains indispensable for the acquisition and preservation of wealth. In the countryside a
striking continuity ensues: in the same manner as earlier, one does not obtain land so much
with money, as through political favors by the political power, which, therefore, is maintained
at all costs.
Thereby, a wide spectrum of politically conditioned forms of land appropriation can
be observed: from outright takeover using military force, through types less crude but
still based on political power, to privileged access to confiscated or state lands by virtue
of superior political influence. 
Mexico undoubtedly suffered most from this type of land appropriations in the 19th
and early 20th centuries, notably in periods of civil war and political conflict between
rival power groups. For example, haciendas were confiscated by political opponents and
given over to their own adherents, or military commanders illegally took possession of
agricultural estates, ran them for their own profit and ultimately claimed them as their
own property. These were widespread practices in the wake of the struggles for indepen-
dence in the early 19th century as well as during the Mexican Revolution between 1910
and 1930 (Tutino 1975; Tobler 1971). Mexico was the only Latin American country
where land appropriations, at that time, also took place “from below”, by rebel peasants
during the revolution. It is true that some of these estates were returned to their former
owners by the more conservative revolutionary leaders, but in the course of the later pha-
ses of the revolution (1920-1940) a considerable part of them passed into the hands of
the peasants. 
In the 19th and early 20th century, other more subtle political methods of land acquisi-
tion played a considerable role, too. One of the best examples for the 19th century is the
rise of Luis Terrazas, caudillo of the north Mexican state of Chihuahua, to become one
of the largest land owners in all of Mexico. Terrazas had been able to purchase from the
Mexican government, on specially favorable terms, one of the largest haciendas in nort-
hern Mexico, which had been confiscated from the former owner because of his collabo-
ration with the emperor Maximilian (Tobler 1984: 104-105). Additionally, thanks to his
political influence, Terrazas profited from the confiscation of church lands by the liberal
government in 1859, as well as from the sale of public lands in the 1880’s and 90’s. Con-
trary to the original intention, both measures did not entail a widening of the landowner
class, but rather a consolidation of latifundism. 
In Argentina, military land appropriations played a smaller role than in Mexico. Tra-
ditional historiography often considered the land grants of generals Rosas and Roca to
their military and political adherents to be one of the essential causes of the later domi-
nance of great estates; actually, the effects of those grants remained rather limited. It is
true that, in Argentina too, power holders distributed land time and again in order to
honor political loyalty or military services, but they hardly transferred existing estates. In
view of the limited church domain, the alienation of church property was of no impor-
tance either. Even in the recently opened regions of the Argentine frontier, the state did
not give out real plots, but issued tradable land certificates –much as in the case of the
military bounties in the U.S. In Argentina, however, this practice favored land concentra-
tion, for it was above all smallholders who transferred their certificates. Although the
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political influence of the estate-owning elite in Argentina promoted the successive spread
of latifundism, we shall see that it was rather institutional and economic factors which
presented the greater obstacles for the lower and middle classes in obtaining land. Espe-
cially in the early 19th century, there are examples of politically privileged access to
public land in the U.S. too, notably by influential private land companies. Also later,
corruption and bribery as well as lobbying the federal government and congress did play
a considerable role, particularly in the case of the huge land grants to railroad companies.
However, in the general context of the relative egalitarian land policy in the U.S. these
factors were of only minor importance. 
II. Broadly speaking, land was allocated mainly by market mechanisms not only in
the U.S. but to a considerable extent in Argentina, too. Nevertheless, Argentina brought
forth the typical Latin American landholding patterns characterized by great estates,
extensive land use and the lack of a strong middle sector. Why was this?
In the U.S., the state played a crucial role in the formation of relatively egalitarian
landholding patterns. In this context, two premises were of special importance: first, a
functioning state was established immediately after independence, creating a stable
administrative and institutional framework for the land policy; second, regarding issues
of land policy, political predominance shifted from the conservative aristocrats to the
populist agrarians during the 19th century. In particular, the second factor was of utmost
importance for the specific orientation of the U.S. land policy. Already in the late colo-
nial period, the social and economic as well as the political dependence of the rural lower
and middle classes on the colonial elite of British North America was less marked than in
Spanish America. The mass mobilization in the wake of the war of independence against
Great Britain additionally fostered the emancipation of the lower and middle classes
from the upper class. In the course of the 19th century, this development gained strength
also because of the particular change which the federal state and the crucial socio-politi-
cal forces underwent in the context of the territorial expansion. As regards the land
issues, the ensuing socio-demographic change altered the power relations between the
more conservative old east coast states and the more progressive frontier states by gra-
dually adding new states to the union. Beginning in the 1840’s this process received
additional impetus from the mass of mostly land-seeking rural immigrants from Europe
who, for the most part, succeeded in acquiring land, became U.S. citizens and thus exer-
cised political influence. 
Argentina developed in quite another direction. Contrary to the U.S., even in the pro-
vince of Buenos Aires, state building remained weak in the decades after the end of the
war of independence; in fact, a true federal state came into being only in 1862. Gener-
ally, the “state” was much less capable than in the U.S. of enforcing an effective land
policy. The relative weakness of the Argentine state was rooted in the particular social
conditions at the end of the colonial era and the processes triggered by the Independen-
cia, whose mobilization effects did not lead to the economic and political emancipation
of the rural lower and middle classes. 
The unsteady “fluctuating” character of the Argentine rural society had its class of
rootless gauchos, dependent peones on the estancias, tenants or sharecroppers on the
land of big land owners, and, interwoven in these structures, some small and medium
farmers of more or less precarious status. If it did not prevent caudillistic patron-client
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relations from continuing within the rural militias, it did, nevertheless, free the everyday
life of the rural lower classes from effective clientelistic control by the big landowners.
Such control was, for example, widespread on the large haciendas in Mexico. In this
context the rural elite could not establish itself as a hegemonic class. Lacking a reliable
rural power base, the estancieros had to concede the leadership in the state building pro-
cess to an emerging group of urban revolutionary intellectuals. Of course, the estancie-
ros dominated rural society but their relationship to the state remained weak as long as
the latter respected their economic interests. Thus, the low capacity of the Argentine state
to effectively penetrate the society and to deliberately shape new economic realities, was
matched by a society whose lower echelons evaded state control and whose most power-
ful members did not care much about establishing strong political institutions. Therefore,
in Argentina, society and state constituted relatively autonomous zones, more so than in
the U.S. and Mexico. Using a notion introduced by Michael Mann (1994: 105-127; 1995:
479), we could say that Argentine society was not successfully “caged” within an emer-
ging nation state. In the case of the U.S., the rapid “caging” of the lower and middle clas-
ses in particular entailed a dynamic change of power relations, tending towards levelling
the most glaring social disparities and strengthening democratic participation. In Argen-
tina, the lack of this dynamism led to the preservation of power relations as they had
emerged in the early 19th century. 
In that country the socio-demographic consequences and, particularly, the political
outcome of the territorial expansion were completely unlike the results in the U.S. A pro-
gressively expanding area of settlement such as in the U.S. did not exist in Argentina. In
particular, the advancement of the Argentine frontier did not bring about a permanent
and relatively dense settlement of the newly-opened –or at least conquered– lands.
While, in view of the specific economic use of the pampas and the predominance of cat-
tle raising up to the 1860’s, the demographic consequences of the “expansion” remained
weak, its political effects (as witnessed in the U.S.) completely failed to appear. 
Basically, the territorial expansion of Argentina in the 19th century took place in the
form of a military conquest. Thus, either national or provincial claims of sovereignty
preceded successive settlement. This was also true of the expansion to the south from the
80’s onwards. Contrary to the U.S. the new territories did not rapidly gain the status of
member states with equal rights, and additionally the Argentine elite effectively limited
voting rights to the upper class and part of the educated (urban) middle class until the
reform law of 1912.
European mass immigration, commencing in the 1870’s, was also ineffectual in cau-
sing substantial changes. Although the area under cultivation began to expand very
rapidly and the number of European immigrants rose heavily, the socio-demographic and
political effects of this development differed completely from those in the U.S. Not even
the massive expansion of agriculture (mainly wheat production) brought about perma-
nent settlement with people putting down roots as in the U.S. A large part of the harvest-
ing was carried out by migrant workers; moreover, the specific Argentine system of land
tenancy reduced tenants to “agricultural nomads”. Nor were the European immigrants
able to exert political influence, as most of them did not attempt to obtain citizenship
until the First World War. Thus, compared to the U.S., in Argentina specific economic
factors, the different behavior of the European immigrants, and, in particular, certain
institutional barriers, making it extremely difficult for new settlers to obtain land, were
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of much greater importance for the access to (or exclusion from) landholding. These fac-
tors will be briefly summarized in the following passages. 
III. The Argentine state was not only too weak to overcome the considerable diffi-
culties of peopling the vast territories of the Pampa, Patagonia and the Chaco, it erected
for its part institutional obstacles to such a development. From the perspective of small
and medium farmers, the social and political privileges of the elite with regard to land
were less of an obstacle to the purchase of plots than generally uncertain property rights,
time-consuming and expensive judicial procedures and the inefficient credit system. In
1895, an article in the Review of the River Plate denounced the harmful practices. 
In theory, any new settler can get a grant of land, and if he were to go to the land office,
and find an official who spoke his language, he would be greatly impressed with the liberality
of the Argentine government. But when he came to test this liberality in practice, his opinions
might undergo a most disagreeable modification. After wasting an incredible amount of time
and patience, he would probably take advice from some friend, and buy or acquire land from
some private holder rather than hang about the government office to no purpose. We know, as
a matter of fact, that it has required two or three years to obtain from the government the right
to rent land for which there was no competition and this although the services of an agent
learned in government trámites (bureaucratic procedures) have been employed31. 
John H. Coatsworth was one of the first scholars on Latin American history who
stressed the importance of institutional factors for the low economic growth rate of the
region32. He argues that high political risks and inefficient property rights raised transac-
tion costs. In addition to this, the state was unable to provide public goods indispensable
for sustained economic growth, such as reliable judicial and police institutions or an effi-
cient transport infrastructure (Coatsworth 1999). It would seem, at first glance, that
Argentina did not correspond to this analysis. Even if, up to the 1930’s, her growth rate
could not compete with that of the U.S., it exceeded that of many other countries. How-
ever, the growth of the Argentine economy was not based on increasing productivity but
on the extensive incorporation of new natural resources into the production process. The
benefits from this growth mainly accrued to the small upper class, and did not trigger
spread effects that would have brought development on a broad scale. Moreover, only
weak positive links evolved between economic growth and political democratization,
strengthening the supremacy of the state over civil society. 
Although Argentina was eventually established as a confederation according to the
model of the U.S., her federalism took on an executive-biased and highly centralized cha-
racter. The constitutional compromise of 1862 between the confederation and the provin-
ce of Buenos Aires had only been possible by disregarding broad democratic procedures
in the provinces. Up to the 1880’s, the limited administrative and financial resources of
the federal state prevented a clear-cut shift of power to the central government. The pro-
vinces themselves had only weakly institutionalized polities. Of utmost importance was
their dependence on the fiscal resources of the federal state. The struggle between the
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national government and the provinces for a stable balance of power was aggravated by
the peculiar (hegemonic) position of the province of Buenos Aires. A solid institutional
and financial basis for the confederation was only achieved under General Roca, which
enabled the federal government to impose its claim to hegemony over the provinces. 
There were actually no fundamental disagreements between the provinces and the
national state as far as land settlement policy was concerned. However, the unresolved
question of authority between the two levels of government did not allow for a coherent
settlement policy. Indeed, one or two provinces successfully promoted colonization, but
without the effective support of the national government there was no way to break up
the traditional landholding structure. Conversely, federal land laws could only partially
be enforced for lack of efficient provincial administrations on the spot. Thus, the institu-
tional obstacles for the peopling of the Argentine frontier with small and medium-sized
family farmers did not have its roots in a strong state controlled by big landowners, but
in the incomplete formation of political classes and the delayed state-building after attain-
ing independence. Against this unstable institutional background the idea of peopling 
the frontier gained momentum only in the last three decades of the 19th century. The
enormous territorial expansion at the beginning of the 1880’s created the preconditions
for Alberdi’s gobernar es poblar and mass immigration. But already at the turn of the
century, even before net immigration reached its peak, the closure of the agricultural
frontier became apparent. Most of the newly won land in Patagonia and in the Chaco
region was undesirable land for settlement. At the same time, the most intensive waves
of immigrants coincided with extremely dynamic economic developments in the already
settled area of the pampas and the seaports of the Littoral. A large part of the best agri-
cultural land of the pampas was also productive grazing land, most of which was in the
possession of big landowners. Though it would be incorrect to denounce the estancieros
as actual land monopolists, immigrants attracted by the profit opportunities of the flou-
rishing wheat market and willing to settle faced well-entrenched claims of property. It is
true that, after 1880, there was an opening of the land market, which allowed the most
successful immigrants to establish themselves as independent farmers and, occasionally,
even to rise to the group of the estancieros; compared to the U.S., however, for most of
the landless immigrants and Argentinians, the chances of acquiring land on their own
remained limited. Usually they gained access to land not by means of property but
through tenancy and sharecropping.
IV. As regions of recent settlement both the U.S. and Argentina provided a set of
opportunities for enrichment and progress for hard-working people with initiative. This
was true, at any rate, of members of the elite who had privileged access to capital and
land by virtue of their superior position in society and politics. For the lower and middle
classes the situation was quite distinct in both countries. Their rights were more respec-
ted and they had more political influence in the U.S. than in Argentina. As a consequence,
in the latter country the institutional environment was by no means favorable for 
small and medium agriculturalists. For them the purchase of a plot involved not only
high economic but also institutional risks and exorbitant transaction costs. Basically, this
assertion applied to the whole of Latin America. In the 1880’s, a contemporary observer
of Brazil, the former U.S. Consul General in Rio de Janeiro, paradigmatically described
the situation. 
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During three centuries the Crown has been making grants of land to various parties, the
records of which do not appear to exist in any accessible form, if they exist at all. A man
might expend weeks in exploring the wild lands, and if he should then find a tract he wished
to purchase, he would not be sure of a clear title. If he resolved to run his risk and buy of the
Government, his first proceeding would be to formally request, in writing, the president of
the province in which the land was situated to cause the tract to be surveyed. The president of
the province would designate a surveyor to make the survey and report upon the land, after
which the Government would fix the price and conditions for its sale. If a sale should be
effected, the purchaser would take the land subject to the claims of other individuals, which,
if any were preferred, would, unless amicably adjusted, have to be determined by expensive
and dilatory proceedings before a judicial tribunal33.
As this paper showed, the U.S. and Argentina differed in another fundamental point:
the mutual integration of society and state. In the U.S., a close relationship evolved bet-
ween all layers of society and the state from local self-government up to the top of the
federal legislative and executive. In Argentina, interaction between society and state
remained relatively weak. This was certainly true of the rural lower and middle classes,
but, compared to the U.S., it applied also to the upper class, which was at the same time
less capable and less motivated by the circumstances to erect a strong state that effecti-
vely claimed the monopoly of power. 
Contrary to Latin America as a whole, at the end of the “long” 19th century both the
U.S. and Argentina could reasonably be –and in fact were– considered successful federal
republics with a promising future. Today, with the advantage of hindsight, we know bet-
ter. The U.S. stand unequalled as the world’s superpower; Argentina, haunted by econo-
mic and political crisis, has not yet crossed the threshold to the industrialized countries
of the First World. Taken by their own words, the founding fathers of the U.S. –if some-
times against their own intentions– mostly succeeded, whereas, in Argentina Alberdi’s
“Possible Republic” failed to pave the way for the “Real Republic”34.
In this paper we have sustained the view that the basis for this distinct outcome was
laid by the specific developments during the 19th century. If we consider the process of
state and nation building in this period, not only as the formal establishment of a nation
state with well defined boundaries and a core of relatively stable institutional arrange-
ments but also as a multifaceted process of social integration, we can make out notably
three shortcomings or strengths respectively, which are directly influenced by the way
the access to land was organized. These are the degree of political democratization, the
degree of social differentiation and the pace of economic growth. With respect to the lat-
ter, both economies were able to take their chances within the emerging capitalist world
market and grew remarkably during the 19th century. But, while in the U.S. industrializa-
tion and technological progress opened a new frontier for economic growth well before
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the closure of the westward expansion, in Argentina the economy began to lose vigor
when the costs of occupying open territories exceeded the expected returns. Obviously,
the Argentine economy had grown on too narrow a basis and had failed to create the pre-
requisites to adapt successfully to changing circumstances. This also had to do with the
lack of social differentiation. Unlike the U.S., where self-intensifying economic exchan-
ge networks evolved among a wide array of consumers and producers, Argentine society,
with its marginalized rural lower and middle classes and its outward oriented upper
class, did not constitute the basis for a sufficiently dynamic internal market. At the same
time, while in the U.S. the “state” played a decisive role in coping with the difficulties of
dynamic growth, the Argentine “state” was too weak to support sustained development.
It not only lacked the capacity to really impose its policy within the economic and social
realm, but it also lacked democratically legitimized procedures allowing for the effective
articulation of social interests outside a small elite. In all of these contexts the organiza-
tion of the access to land is a crucial factor for an understanding of the causes of such
differences, not only between the U.S. and Argentina, but also, as Ezequiel Gallo (1977:
332-340) has pointed out, within Argentina itself, between more democratic and dyna-
mic wheat regions and areas of large cattle-raising estancias tending to social and politi-
cal encrustation. 
It is true that external factors, such as the incentives set by the world market or the
effects of international capital flows, had an impact on the different developments within
Argentina and also between that country and the U.S., but these factors mattered only in a
very general sense in pushing for permanent change. This change, however, occurred within
historical settings made up of particular factor endowments, institutional structures and
cultural practices35. It was such internal factors which acted on the modes of access to
land and were for their part influenced by the latter. Responding to similar incentives,
very different socio-political conditions and landholding patterns evolved in the U.S. and
Argentina in the course of the 19th century. Although the differences have never been
absolute, and examples of almost any aspect of social life could have been found side by
side in both societies, their sums differed more from each other than the particular ele-
ments of each equation. To a great extent, this was due to the different roles the two states
were able to play. Close interaction between state and society would by no means end
conflicts (on the contrary) but, in the end, in the U.S. it helped establish procedures which
would strengthen both state and society and enable them together to overcome the obsta-
cles of development, while in Argentina this process remained largely incomplete. 
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